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Abstract: Aid flows continue to be volatile and unpredictable, even though it is widely accepted 
that this erodes the effectiveness of foreign aid. We argue that fragmented donor-recipient 
relationships, notably the large number of minor aid relations that tend to be associated with 
donors’ desire to ‘fly their flag’ around the world, increase aid unpredictability. Our empirical 
analysis of the determinants of aid unpredictability suggests that aid becomes less predictable 
with more fragmented donor-recipient relationships. Specifically, the effect of fragmentation on 
overshooting previous spending plans is statistically significant and substantively important. In 
contrast, fragmented donor-recipient relationships have no effect on the shortfall of actual aid 
compared to donors’ spending plans. 
Keywords: aid predictability, donor fragmentation, forward spending plans 
JEL classification: F35 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted among scholars that volatile and unpredictable aid flows impair the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting the economic and social development of recipient 
countries (Lensink and Morrissey 2000; Kharas 2008; Mokoro 2011; Kodama 2012). Celasun 
and Walliser (2008) stress that both aid shortfalls and windfalls tend to undermine 
macroeconomic management in the recipient countries.  Bulir and Hamann (2008) argue that it is 
mainly in poor, aid-dependent recipient countries that volatile aid has adverse macroeconomic 
effects.
1
  
The donors have principally accepted that predictability in aid relationships is important.
2
 
In the so-called Paris Declaration of 2005, donors committed “to provide reliable indicative 
commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable 
fashion according to agreed schedules” (paragraph 26).3 The subsequent Accra Agenda for 
Action in 2008 strengthened this commitment: “Beginning now, donors will provide developing 
countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward 
expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that 
developing countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic 
frameworks” (paragraph 26). Nevertheless, aid flows continue to be unpredictable from the 
perspective of various recipient countries. Assessing the progress in implementing the Paris 
Declaration, the OECD (2011a: 75) noted that some recipient countries (e.g., Angola and El 
Salvador) received only half of what donors indicated three years earlier, while some other 
                                                          
1
 However, this claim is disputed by Hudson and Mosley (2008). 
2
 For details, see e.g. OECD (2011a: chapter 5). 
3
 For details on the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action see: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (accessed: June 2014). 
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recipient countries (e.g., the Central African Republic and Nigeria) received more than twice as 
much as indicated before. 
This raises the question of why aid relationships continue to be unpredictable. We explore 
this question by analyzing the determinants of aid predictability, which to the best of our 
knowledge represents our first novel contribution to the literature. To do so, we analyze the effect 
of various factors that may result in deviations between actual and planned aid flows, including 
changing conditions in the recipient countries, donor characteristics, and strategic and trade-
related aid motives. As our second contribution, we focus on one particular factor that has 
received significant attention in the literature on the effectiveness of aid. Specifically, we explore 
whether and, if so, why fragmented donor-recipient relationships have an impact on deviations 
between actual and planned aid flows in both upward and downward direction. Kilby (2011) as 
well as Gosh and Kharas (2011) observe a steeply rising number of aid projects, while the 
average size of projects has shrunk considerably. Gosh and Kharas (2011: 1918) suspect that the 
fragmentation of aid “makes it even harder for aid agencies to coordinate their activities and 
duplication and waste could be growing. Hence, we hypothesize that the large number of 
quantitatively minor aid relations that tend to be associated with donors’ desire to ‘fly their flag’ 
around the world, instead of coordinating their aid allocation more closely, exacerbates aid 
unpredictability. We find that aid indeed becomes less predictable under conditions of 
fragmented donor-recipient relationships. Strikingly, however, the effect is contingent on whether 
actual aid exceeds or falls short of previous spending plans. Specifically, the effect of 
fragmentation on overshooting previous spending plans is statistically significant and 
substantively important whilst the effect on shortfalls of actual aid compared to spending plans is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero and diminishingly small in size.   
5 
 
Some donors (particularly Greece, Japan and the United States) do not release detailed 
forward spending plans.
4
 Nevertheless, it is feasible to assess the determinants of the gaps 
between actual aid flows and the forward spending plans across recipient countries by drawing on 
data for the group of all donors as released by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) in its recent Reports on Aid Predictability (OECD [a]).
5
 We describe these data in more 
detail in Section 3, after specifying our hypothesis on fragmented donor-recipient relationships in 
Section 2. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The role of fragmented donor-recipient relations 
Donors may have good reasons for revising earlier spending plans, notably when the need of 
recipients for aid is higher or lower than expected. On the one hand, earlier spending plans may 
be revised upwards for recipient countries which have an unexpectedly high need for aid, e.g., 
due to natural disasters. On the other hand, spending plans may be revised downwards for 
recipient countries whose economic situation develops better than expected. Holding the need for 
aid constant, recipient countries may ‘deserve’ more aid than originally planned, e.g., when local 
governance conditions improve. Donors favoring democratic regimes are likely to increase aid 
allocations after countries move toward a more democratic regime. By contrast, countries may 
deserve less aid than anticipated when local conditions for making effective use of planned aid 
volumes deteriorate. In particular, donors may cut planned aid after military coups and 
regressions to autocracy.  
                                                          
4
 According to the 2012 DAC Report on Aid Predictability, 15 out of 23 DAC members agreed to publish detailed 
spending plans (OECD [a], 2012 9). Only ten DAC donor countries participated in the assessment of aid 
predictability by Mokoro Ltd. (2011). As acknowledged in Mokoro’s report, “there is a self-selection bias as the 
donors have chosen whether to participate or not in this exercise” (page 17). See Appendix 3 for the list of donors 
not releasing any spending plans in particular years. 
5
 For the list of available reports, see: http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/aidpredictability.htm  
(accessed: June 2014). 
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Apart from needs- and merit-related reasons to revise earlier spending plans, we 
hypothesize that the predictability of aid flows is impaired by the presence of various donors with 
uncoordinated aid activities in a particular recipient country. According to Easterly and 
Williamson (2011: 1935), it is widely agreed that the effectiveness of aid is undermined by “too 
many donors in too many countries, stretched across too many sectors or projects.” For instance, 
Acharya et al. (2006: 1) argue that successful aid experiences after World War II – notably US 
support to Western Europe under the Marshal Plan and to South Korea and Taiwan – have proved 
difficult to repeat since “the number of sources and channels of aid have increased faster than the 
actual volume of aid.” Today, “aid often underperforms because it flows through too many 
institutional channels” (ibid: 6).6 The proliferation of donors and the fragmentation of aid 
relations render aid less effective not only by increasing transaction costs but also by weakening 
each single donor’s incentive to assume responsibility for the overall development impact of total 
aid transfers. Competing donors are suspected to ‘fly the flag’ and care mainly about the visibility 
of their own projects rather than about the effectiveness of aid (Chun et al. 2010). 
Among the transmission mechanisms through which fragmented donor-recipient relations 
could impair the effectiveness of aid, previous studies have paid particular attention to adverse 
effects on bureaucratic quality in the recipient countries. According to Acharya et al. (2006: 6), 
indirect transaction costs “take the form of the dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behaviour 
that is stimulated by aid proliferation.” Knack and Rahman (2007: 193) present a formal model 
and empirical evidence “suggesting that competitive donor practices, where there are many small 
donors and no dominant donor, erode administrative capacity in recipient country governments.” 
Kilby (2011: 1981) stresses an increasing number of smaller aid projects as an important 
implication of aid fragmentation, causing “more administrative work for overtaxed recipient 
                                                          
6
 For a similar line of reasoning, see Knack and Rahman (2007). 
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governments per dollar of aid received.”7 Other transmission channels have been largely 
neglected so far. Our analysis therefore aims to complement the existing literature by identifying 
another important transmission mechanism and testing the hypothesis that fragmented donor-
recipient relations lead to volatile and unpredictable aid flows, thereby undermining the 
recipients’ macroeconomic management. 
From the recipients’ perspective it becomes increasingly difficult to predict expected aid 
flows in a reliable way if they have to negotiate with various donors. Recipient countries in Asia 
and Africa had to deal with an average number of 26 and 24 (bilateral and multilateral) official 
donors, respectively, in 2009 (OECD 2011b). The OECD report also observed that the problem 
of “too little aid from too many donors” was most common in low-income countries with the 
least institutional capacity to manage complex relations with an “increasing number of financially 
less-significant actors” (ibid: 8). Furthermore, it appears that the fragmentation problem 
originates to a large extent from bilateral sources of aid. Hence, our empirical analysis focuses on 
23 bilateral donors from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
The outcome of negotiations with various donors is especially difficult to predict when 
donors do not coordinate their activities or even compete for attractive projects in recipient 
countries. In contrast to repeated official DAC declarations such as the Paris Declaration of 2005 
and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008, the available empirical evidence suggests that 
uncoordinated aid activities and the failure of donors, including those with only marginal 
contributions to overall aid, to agree on a clearer division of labor at the recipient country level 
continue to impede aid predictability. For instance, Aldasoro et al. (2010) provide descriptive 
statistics pointing to persistent aid duplication. Frot and Santiso (2011) find evidence for herding 
among donors by employing herding measures inspired by the financial market literature. The 
                                                          
7
 Similarly, Knack et al. (2011: 1911) argue that the “proliferation of distinct aid projects imposes unnecessary 
transaction costs on recipients and unduly taxes their administrative capacity.”  
8 
 
regression analyses of Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) indicate that coordination among donors has 
even weakened since the Paris Declaration. The OECD-DAC’s own monitoring of donor 
behavior acknowledges that little progress has been made among donors to implement the Paris 
Declaration (OECD 2011a). This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: More fragmented donor-recipient relations result in larger deviations of actual aid 
disbursements from predicted and planned aid. 
 
The unpredictability of aid flows is not necessarily symmetric in the sense that overshooting and 
undershooting are equally likely. For instance, Frot and Santiso (2011) find evidence for 
asymmetric herding in the donors’ response to political transitions in recipient countries. 
According to a preliminary assessment of aid predictability in a recent DAC report, overshooting 
is more likely than undershooting (OECD a, 2010). Aggregate figures for 2009 indicated that, on 
average, each donor disbursed, respectively, 3% and 8% more aid than planned one or two years 
earlier.
8
 The OECD (a, 2010: 6) mentions the “conservatism of donors’ predictions” and 
unexpected aid challenges in the context of food, energy and financial crises as plausible 
explanations of overshooting.
9
 The sudden outbreak of Ebola in several countries in Western 
Africa in the summer of 2014 provides another example of unexpected challenges requiring aid 
interventions over and above previously planned activities. 
Importantly, fragmented donor-recipient relations may help explain why overshooting 
previous spending plans is more likely than undershooting and why the extent of overshooting is 
                                                          
8
 As noted below, however, this average hides considerable differences between donors. It hides even larger 
heterogeneity across recipient countries: In 48 per cent of observations in our sample did recipients experience an aid 
under-shoot rather than an aid over-shoot. 
9
 Specifically, the report notes that aid programming by multilateral agencies may be deliberately conservative 
during the process of pending replenishment negotiations. 
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on average larger than the extent of undershooting.
10
 Donor fragmentation may grant recipient 
governments leverage to extract extra funds over and above planned aid by playing off various 
donors against each other. By contrast, recipient countries would have less such bargaining power 
when being confronted by a dominant donor or a small group of coordinating donors.  
This would explain why “recipient governments also contribute to proliferation-
fragmentation, above all perhaps by taking few initiatives to overcome these problems” (Acharya  
et al. 2006: 14). In a similar vein, Knack and Rahman (2007) argue that recipient governments 
have weak incentives to avoid competitive donor practices by limiting the number of active 
donors and discontinuing non-significant aid relations. For instance, line ministries in the 
recipient country may exploit the duplication of donor efforts at the sector level to gain access to 
extra aid funds, including from quantitatively minor donors attempting to fly their flag and 
improve visibility. 
Incentive structures on the part of donors render it also more likely that with fragmented 
donor-recipient relations forward spending plans are overshot rather than undershot. Donors often 
compete for attractive projects, the attention and time of policymakers and public servants, and 
influence over the recipient country’s policies (Acharya 2006). Topping up planned aid in 
negotiations with the recipient government offers a promising way to win the competition among 
donor countries.  
Incentives for overshooting also appear from a public choice perspective on the 
competition for resources and competencies among various aid agencies within donor countries.
11
 
According to Kilby (2011), competition among aid agencies is closely associated with 
fragmented aid, notably by leading to an increasing number of small projects. Agencies benefit in 
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 US$ 61 million as opposed to 51 million on average in our sample. 
11
 For instance, Germany and the United States are well-known for their complicated net of agencies engaged in 
foreign aid. 
10 
 
terms of status and future budgets from a more global project portfolio, even if the average size 
of projects is rather small.
12
 At the same time, bureaucratic competition among fragmented 
agencies creates incentives for overshooting previously planned aid budgets. It would clearly be 
counterproductive not to fully exhaust currently available resources, considering that aid agencies 
are typically assumed to have the objective of maximizing future aid budgets (e.g., Knack and 
Rahman 2007). Whenever new and unexpected tasks emerge, the aid agencies are likely to argue 
that previously planned outlays, based on ‘conservative’ programming in parliament and central 
government, are insufficient to meet additional challenges. Hence, the incentives guiding agency 
behavior suggest that overshooting planned aid is more likely than undershooting. Since, all other 
things equal, with more donor fragmentation there will also be more aid agencies of donors 
involved and hence more competition among donor agencies, donor fragmentation is again more 
likely to result in over- than in under-shooting of actual aid.  
This leads to a more specific second hypothesis on the predictability of aid: 
 
H2: The effect of more fragmented donor-recipient relations is larger on overshooting of actual 
aid compared to spending plans than on undershooting.  
 
3. Data and approach 
As noted before, we follow the DAC Reports on Aid Predictability (OECD [a]) in considering 
CPA as the basis for calculating gaps between actual and planned aid as our dependent variable. 
As stressed by the DAC (see, e.g., OECD [a] 2009: 10), CPA captures the contributions of 
donors to ‘core’ development programs; it “is subjected to multi-year planning at 
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 Kilby’s reasoning may apply especially to the aid agencies of relatively small donors whose “aid agency officials 
derive prestige and influence from maintaining a global presence on par with the larger bilateral and multilateral 
agencies” (Knack and Rahman 2007: 195). 
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country/regional level and reflects the amount of aid that can be programmed at those levels.” 
CPA is defined through exclusion, by subtracting from overall aid those items that (i) are 
unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief); (ii) do not involve cross-border flows 
(e.g., administrative costs); (iii) are not part of cooperation agreements between governments 
(e.g., food aid); and (iv) cannot be programmed at the country level (e.g., core funding of NGOs). 
Again in line with DAC practice, we use gross disbursements of CPA in the following. 
We draw on the annual DAC Reports on Aid Predictability (available since 2008) to 
calculate the deviations between actual and planned disbursements in constant 2011 US$ during 
the 2008-2011 period. As noted in the introduction, the forward spending plans of individual 
donors revealing the distribution of planned aid across recipient countries were kept confidential 
by the DAC during our period of observation. Nevertheless, the aggregated information provided 
by the DAC for aid flows to all recipient countries in 2009 indicates that donors differ 
considerably in terms of adhering to previous spending plans (see Table 1 in the 2010 Report for 
details). The DAC’s one-year predictability ratio, relating actual flows in 2009 to flows planned 
for 2009 one year before, ranged from 60% (Italy) to 120% (Germany) among bilateral donors. 
Deviations from plans issued one year before were less than five percent for just seven of the 20 
bilateral donors listed in the report. Compared to bilateral donors, multilateral agencies typically 
exceeded previous plans (on average by 13% within a year). 
13
 
For the subsequent analysis, we compare actual CPA disbursements by the group of 
donors covered in the DAC reports with CPA disbursements as planned one, two, or three years 
earlier.
14
 Given that planned CPA is available since 2008 the data allows for nine comparisons 
for each recipient country: four comparisons of actual CPA with plans in the preceding year, 
three comparisons of actual CPA with plans two years earlier, and two comparisons of actual 
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 The issue of donor-specific adherence to forward spending plans is taken up again in the concluding section. 
14
 The 2012 report was the first with extended forward spending plans of four years, instead of three years. 
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CPA with plans three years earlier. In our empirical analysis of the determinants of deviations 
between actual and planned aid, we pool all nine observations of the dependent variable for each 
recipient country. Considering that deviations between actual and planned aid may be larger 
when the comparison refers to earlier plans, we include ‘deviation-specific’ fixed effects 
accounting for the number of years between the release of planned aid for a particular year and 
actual aid in that particular year. In addition to the pooled estimations, we perform estimations 
where we assess the determinants for one, two and three year deviations separately (see the 
robustness tests at the end of Section 4 for details). 
Importantly, we observe positive and negative deviations between actual and planned aid. 
In about 55 percent of observations in our sample we observe positive (upward) deviations from 
spending plans. For a start, we do not differentiate between positive and negative deviations with 
our dependent variable simply being the natural log of absolute deviations, assuming that our 
explanatory variables affect deviations in both directions in the same way. Subsequently, we 
relax the assumption that the factors that result in positive deviations are the same and affect aid 
predictability in the same strength as negative deviations. Hence, we estimate separate effects for 
positive and negative deviations of actual aid from planned aid for a particular recipient-year 
combination. This gives us two coefficients for each variable in the estimations, one for positive 
and one for negative deviations. To estimate elasticities, we not only log the dependent variable 
but also all non-categorical explanatory variables. 
As discussed in Section 2, fragmented donor-recipient relationships represent our 
explanatory variable of major interest. Recent academic studies often refer to the industrial 
organization literature and employ concentration measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index (HHI) to measure the inverse of aid fragmentation. In particular, the HHI is widely used to 
rank donors by their degree of specialization and the concentration of aid in a limited number of 
13 
 
recipient countries and aid sectors (e.g., Easterly and Williamson 2011; Knack et al. 2011).
15
 
Kilby (2011) employs the HHI to capture several dimensions of fragmentation, including agency 
fragmentation within donor countries and aid fragmentation in recipient countries. In contrast to 
the popular donor rankings, our focus is on fragmentation at the level of recipient countries, i.e., 
“the degree to which a given country’s aid receipts are fragmented across many different donors” 
(Kilby 2011: 1981). 
Instead of calculating the HHI at the level of recipient countries, we follow the official 
OECD-DAC definition by calculating two fragmentation ratios reflecting the relative importance 
of ‘non-significant’ aid relations for each recipient country j in year t (OECD 2009; OECD 
2011b). We prefer this approach since we expect donors to comply with official DAC rules if and 
when attempting to reduce fragmentation. Moreover, practitioners in the aid business may more 
easily observe whether they engage in non-significant aid relations, compared to assessing their 
‘contribution’ to a low HHI. The ratio Fragmentation_1 considers aid relations to be non-
significant if donor i provides a lower share of aid to recipient country j than the donor i’s overall 
share in aid to all recipient countries. The number of non-significant aid relations is then related 
to the number of all aid relations of recipient country j in year t. Importantly, the number of all 
aid relations excludes those donors among the 23 DAC donor countries in our sample not 
providing any aid to recipient country j in year t. The ratio Fragmentation_2 considers an aid 
relation to be significant if donor i is among the 23 DAC donors that when ranked according to 
their aid contribution together provide 90 percent of aid or more to recipient country j in year t. 
All other aid relations are considered non-significant. Again, the number of non-significant aid 
relations is then related to the number of all aid relations of recipient country j in year t. Hence, 
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 Ghosh and Kharas (2011) use z-scores to rank donors according to the transparency of their foreign aid operations.  
14 
 
lower values of both Fragmentation_1 and Fragmentation_2 indicate less fragmented aid 
programs in a particular recipient country at a particular point in time. 
As noted in OECD (2011b), Fragmentation_1 may be biased towards significant aid 
relations with smaller donors. Smaller donors are usually involved in fewer recipient countries, 
which makes it easier for them to exceed their global aid share at the country level. In contrast, 
Fragmentation_2 may be biased towards significant aid relations with larger donors, for which it 
is easier to be among the top donors that cumulatively reach the 90 percent threshold at the 
country level. This is why we prefer a third fragmentation measure which combines the two 
criteria underlying Fragmentation_1 and Fragmentation_2. Specifically, Fragmentation_3 
considers only those aid relations to be non-significant if donor i provides a lower share of aid to 
recipient country j than donor i’s overall aid share and if donor i is not among the largest donors 
that cumulatively provide at least 90 percent of aid.
16
 
As will be shown in Section 4, the choice between the three alternative measures of 
fragmented donor-recipient relations hardly matters for our empirical results. The three measures 
are highly correlated with each other; throughout the period of observation (2007-2011), the 
correlation coefficients range from 0.85 to 0.92. It may also be noted that the average 
fragmentation ratios across recipient countries were slightly higher at the end of our period of 
observation, compared to the first year.
17
 This is in striking contrast to repeated donor 
commitments to reduce the fragmentation of aid. 
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 By applying these two criteria to significant aid relations, the OECD introduces a ‘narrow’ definition of 
concentration “where the recipient is a significant partner country both from the donor’s perspective and from the 
recipient’s perspective” (OECD 2009: 11). Likewise, combining the donor’s and the recipient’s perspective with 
regard to non-significant relations results in a ‘narrow’ definition of fragmentation. 
17
 Fragmentation_1 increased from 0.661 to 0.693; Fragmentation_2 increased from 0.630 to 0.664; 
Fragmentation_3 increased from 0.559 to 0.604. 
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The list of other potential determinants of aid predictability follows the standard aid 
allocation literature.
18
 In our baseline specification, we therefore include recipient countries’ 
GDP per capita (GDPpc (ln)) as the most widely used indicator of the recipients’ need for aid.  
Furthermore, we draw on the Polity IV dataset to account for the recipient countries’ merit of aid. 
We use the combined polity score (Polity2), which ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most 
democratic). We also control for the recipient countries’ population (Population (ln)). On the one 
hand, absolute deviations between actual and planned aid tend to be larger for the major aid 
recipients, compared to less populated recipients where both actual and planned aid volumes are 
relatively small. On the other hand, deviations may be relatively large for minor recipient 
countries as disbursements related to just a few projects could be associated with considerable 
deviations from planned aid.  
We include the lagged dependent variable to control for temporal dynamics. The lagged 
dependent variable should have a negative sign if donors aspire to correct for previous (positive 
or negative) deviations. By contrast, a positive sign of the lagged dependent variable would 
indicate that there is inertia in (positive and negative) deviations over time. With the mean of the 
dependent and of the aid fragmentation variables almost constant over the period of our studies, 
we see no reason for being concerned about non-stationarity of the data. 
We also account for the possibility that deviations between actual and planned aid could 
be smaller for forward spending plans released in more recent years (independent of whether they 
are looking forward by one, two, or three years) – assuming that an increasing number of donors 
paid heed to repeated calls for predictable aid relationships and engaged in better planning. 
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 See Appendix 1 on detailed definitions and data sources. Appendix 2 provides summary statistics. 
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Consequently, we include report-specific fixed effects capturing whether data on planned aid are 
taken from reports published in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively.
19
  
In addition, we include year fixed effects accounting for the possibility that deviations of 
actual aid in particular years from previous plans (independent of when these plans were 
released) are systematically larger or smaller for all recipient countries due to general cyclical aid 
fluctuations. Note that we do not include recipient country fixed effects. If we included recipient 
country fixed effects, our estimations would not conform to the hypotheses introduced above. 
Importantly, we expect that aid is less predictable for recipients with more fragmented aid 
relations, rather than only for recipients whose aid relations become more fragmented over time. 
In other words, both the ‘between’ and the ‘within’ variation of fragmentation is relevant in the 
context of our hypotheses. However, we perform a robustness test below where we include 
regional fixed effects, employing the World Bank’s regional classification. Standard errors are 
clustered on the recipient countries since not clustering standard errors may overstate the 
estimator precision. In robustness tests, we show that for the pooled estimations our results are 
robust to two-way clustering on both countries and reports, following Cameron et al. (2011), 
accounting for the fact that observations are not independent across information derived from the 
same DAC report. 
In sum, for our main estimations we firstly estimate models of the following specification: 
 
ln(abs(Aiddevikt)) = β1∙ln(abs(Aiddevikt-1)) + β2∙ln(Popit-1) + β3∙ln(GDPpcit-1) + β4∙Polity2it-1  
+ β5∙Fragmentationit  + μr + λt + εikt, 
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 The 2008 report represents the benchmark. Note that we cannot use data on planned CPA from the 2012 report as 
actual CPA was not yet available. 
17 
 
where i represents recipient country, k represents one, two or three year deviations from spending 
plans, t represents years; μr, λt, and εikt stand for report-specific fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and the error term, respectively.  
In a second step, we estimate separate effects for upward and downward deviations from 
planned aid. We run pooled regressions for these upward and downward deviations, rather than 
performing separate regressions for them. Doing so allows us to easily test for the equality of 
coefficient estimates. We therefore create dummy variables for positive and negative deviations 
of actual from planned aid and interact these with the explanatory variables, thus estimating 
separate coefficients for the effect of variables on over- and under-shooting.
20
 Formally, 
following the notation in Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), we estimate: 
 
ln(abs(Aiddevikt)) = β1∙Dikt
+∙ln(abs(Aiddevikt-1)) + β2∙Dikt
-∙ln(abs(Aiddevikt-1)) + β3∙Dikt
+∙ln(Popit-1) + 
β4∙Dikt
-∙ln(Popit-1) + β5∙Dikt
+∙ln(GDPpcit-1) + β6∙Dikt
-∙ln(GDPpcit-1) + β7∙Dikt
+∙Polity2it-1 + 
β8∙Dikt
-∙Polity2it-1 + β9∙Dikt
+∙Fragmentationit + β10∙Dikt
-∙Fragmentationit  + μr + λt + εikt, 
 
where Dikt
+ 
and Dikt
-
 are dummy variables with Dikt
+ 
= 1 if Aiddevikt > 0 and Dikt
+ 
= 0 otherwise; 
and with Dikt
- 
= 1 if Aiddevikt < 0 and Dikt
- 
= 0 otherwise.
21
 In other words, we estimate nested 
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 The interaction of all explanatory variables with the dummy variables means that we allow the slope of each 
explanatory variable X to be different for upward and downward deviations from planned aid as our dependent 
variable Y. We ‘split’ the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, depending on whether the 
deviation from planned aid is positive or negative, rather than splitting the independent variables according to 
whether they have positive or negative values.  The estimation of different effects of independent variables X on the 
dependent variable Y is appropriate in the present context since the dependent variable is stated in absolute terms 
(i.e., it ignores the sign of the deviation). Our approach implies that the splitting variables (i.e., our dummies for 
negative and positive deviations) have to refer to the same period as the dependent variable (t), not the same period 
as most of the independent variables (t-1). This resembles the approach in Hühne et al. (2014) who assess the impact 
of aid-for-trade and gravity-type determinants on bilateral trade in opposite directions, i.e., on the aid donors’ exports 
to aid recipients and vice versa on the aid donors’ imports from aid recipients. It is in contrast to another strand of the 
literature which estimates different effects on Y for positive values of X and for negative values of X. Examples of 
the latter strand include Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004) and Choi and Kim (2010). 
21
 There are no observations in which actual aid is exactly equal to planned aid. 
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models in order to identify significantly different effects of our explanatory variables on aid 
deviations in opposite directions.  
In additional estimations, we extend the baseline model specification by including further 
potential determinants of aid unpredictability. Specifically, we include a variable measuring 
change in the Polity2 variable, which allows us to test whether it is not just the level of 
democracy that has an effect, but also a move toward democracy. We construct the variable 
Deviation from growth path to capture donor reactions to unexpected changes in the recipient 
countries’ GDP per capita. Specifically, we calculate the deviation in the growth rate of GDP per 
capita from the average growth rate in the three previous years. Further, we consider the (logged) 
number of people affected by natural disasters (Disasters) as an additional indicator of 
unexpectedly large need for aid. Also related to need, we enter two dummy variables accounting 
for so-called aid orphans and aid darlings. The first dummy variable (Orphan) is set to one for all 
recipient-year combinations for which actual aid is below the ‘normal pattern’ by at least one 
percent of the recipient country’s GDP. The second dummy variable (Darling) is set to one for all 
recipient-year combinations for which actual aid is above the ‘normal pattern’ by at least one 
percent of the recipient country’s GDP. In both cases, the ‘normal pattern’ is estimated by 
regressing disbursements of CPA (in constant 2011 US$) to all recipient countries in years 2007-
2011 on the recipient countries’ GDP per capita, their population and their score with regard to 
the World Bank’s governance indicator “voice and accountability.” If donors (re-) allocated aid 
in favor of identified orphans and away from identified darlings, the former dummy should be 
associated with smaller negative and/or larger positive deviations between actual and planned aid, 
while the latter dummy should be associated with smaller positive and/or larger negative 
deviations between actual and planned aid. 
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In another set of extended estimations, we account for two donor characteristics: (i) 
whether or not donors released aid spending plans and (ii) whether donors belong to the group of 
donors classified as egoistic by Berthélemy (2006).
22
 Specifically, we include the share of aid 
coming from donors without forward aid spending plans issued in a particular year (No_spplan) 
and the share of aid coming from egoistic donors (Egoistic) in total aid received from all DAC 
donors by each recipient in year t. One may suspect that deviations between actual and planned 
aid are generally larger (in both directions) when a larger share of aid comes from donors not 
releasing forward spending plans or classified as egoistic. 
We also consider specific egoistic motives of granting aid which could be associated with 
larger deviations between actual and planned aid. To capture political motives we include a 
dummy variable set to one whenever a recipient country was a member of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). We expect that positive deviations between actual and planned aid are larger at 
times of UNSC membership when donors have stronger incentives to buy votes by granting more 
aid. However, this would only be the case to the extent that politically motivated donors could 
not anticipate which recipient countries were likely to be elected as temporary UNSC members 
and did not plan aid disbursements accordingly.
23
 Moreover, political motivations could also be 
associated with larger negative deviations if donors observe UNSC votes first and use aid to 
punish non-compliant and aid-dependent members by cutting planned aid.
24
  
To capture trade-related aid motives, we construct a measure of export competition. 
Following Fuchs et al. (2014), export competition between a dyad of donors d1 and d2 with aid 
                                                          
22
 The group of egoistic donors includes Australia, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Appendix 3 provides 
the list of donors not releasing spending plans in particular years. 
23
 According to Dreher et al. (2014), it is often known well in advance which country will be the next representative 
of a certain region. However, it is not unusual that more than one country competes for this position. In these cases, it 
will only be clear by October of a certain year, the month the election takes place, which country will enter the 
UNSC on January 1 the following year. 
24
 See Vreeland and Dreher (2014) for a detailed analysis of donor attitudes in the UNSC. 
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activities in recipient country i at time t is defined as Min( tidX ,,1 ;
tidX ,,2 ) / Max( tidX ,,1 ;
tidX ,,2 ), with 
X representing the share of exports to recipient i in donor country d’s total exports. A larger value 
of this ratio is supposed to indicate stronger competition within donor dyads with more similar 
export interests in a recipient country.
25
 We then take the average of all dyadic ratios, with higher 
average ratios indicating stronger competition among all donors with aid activities in the recipient 
country. While actual aid may exceed planned aid where donors compete for relevant markets, 
competition for relevant export markets should be rather persistent and be reflected in forward 
spending plans already.  
 
4. Results 
In Table 1, we present our baseline estimations to assess the effects on deviations between actual 
and planned aid of the three alternative fragmentation measures introduced in Section 3, together 
with the core set of variables accounting for the recipient countries’ merit and need for aid. We 
start by not differentiating between the effects of variables on over- as compared to under-
shooting. Before we come to our variables of principal interest, we briefly describe results on the 
other explanatory variables. As can be seen, the lagged dependent variable is statistically 
significant and positive in all three estimations. In other words, donors do not ‘correct’ earlier 
deviations from spending plans by subsequent moves in the opposite direction. However, the 
estimated degree of temporal dependence is rather low. A one percent increase in the deviation 
observed in the previous year is predicted to be followed by an increase in the same direction by 
about 0.22 percent. 
                                                          
25
 A high value of this ratio may also reflect that both countries are equally disinterested in a particular recipient 
country. We control for this possibility by including the average share of a recipient’s exports in a donor’s total 
exports (Exp_ave). 
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Deviations between actual and planned aid are statistically significantly larger for 
recipient-year combinations with a larger population. The country-size effect clearly dominates 
the higher relative volatility of aid in small recipient countries with just a few aid projects. Higher 
GDP per capita goes along with smaller deviations, whereas more democratic regimes experience 
larger deviations from planned aid. 
Most interestingly in the present context, all three alternative measures of fragmented 
donor-recipient relations carry a positive sign and coefficients are of similar size in Table 1, even 
if Fragmentation_2 is not statistically significant at conventional levels. An increase in 
Fragmentation_3, on conceptual grounds our preferred fragmentation measure, by one standard 
deviation (0.13) is predicted to increase the deviation between actual and planned aid by about 11 
percent. 
Next, we move to testing our second hypothesis, with results reported in Table 2. Recall 
that for these tests we report two coefficients for each explanatory variable: the first column 
shows the effect of the explanatory variable on positive deviations between actual and planned 
aid, while the second column shows the effect on negative deviations between actual and planned 
aid. Positive coefficients on an explanatory variable in both columns thus imply that it is 
associated with larger deviations in both directions. Below the respective standard errors we 
report the p-value of an F-test for coefficient equality for the effect on positive versus negative 
deviations for each variable. 
The evidence on the lagged dependent variable in Table 2 indicates that, independently of 
whether we consider positive or negative deviations between actual and planned aid, there is mild 
inertia in upward and downward deviations over time of roughly the same substantial magnitude 
as reported above for the estimations in Table 1. Likewise, the positive effects of population hold 
for deviations in both directions. In contrast, higher GDP per capita in recipient countries goes 
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along with smaller upward deviations, while its negative effect on downward deviations is not 
statistically significant. A more democratic regime is predicted to experience more upward 
deviation of aid with democracy having no statistically significant effect on downward 
deviations.
26
 A one point higher score on Polity2 (on the 21 point scale from -10 to 10) would 
result in an around 4 percent increase in actual aid compared to planned aid.  
Turning to our explanatory variables of principal interest, all three alternative measures of 
fragmented donor-recipient relations prove to be significant, at the one percent level, and positive 
when positive deviations between actual and planned aid represent the dependent variable. In 
quantitative terms, fragmented donor-recipient relations have a considerable impact on aid 
predictability as far as positive deviations from forward spending plans are concerned. An 
increase in Fragmentation_3 by one standard deviation (0.13) is predicted to increase the positive 
deviation between actual and planned aid by about 21 percent – a sizeable if perhaps not very 
large effect. A move from the .05 to the .95 percentile in Fragmentation_3 is predicted to 
increase upward aid deviation by 67 percent. The quantitative impact is similarly large for the 
other measures of donor fragmentation. In contrast to positive deviations, all fragmentation 
measures are statistically insignificant at conventional levels when negative deviations between 
actual and planned aid represent the dependent variable. They are also diminishingly small in 
size. Strikingly, we thus find the effect of fragmented donor-recipient relations not only to be 
smaller for downward deviations compared to upward deviations, but there is in fact no 
statistically significant evidence at all for an effect on the shortfall of actual aid compared to 
previous spending plans. Despite the large standard errors for the coefficients of the 
fragmentation variables for under-shooting of aid, the marginal effects of fragmentation are 
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 Note, however, that the F-tests do not reject the equality of coefficients on GDP per capita and Polity2 for upward 
and downward deviations. 
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statistically significantly larger for over- than for under-shooting for the Fragmentation_2 and 
Fragmentation_3 variables.
27
 
In Table 3, we report results from extended specifications of the specification from Table 
2 in which we include further potential determinants of aid unpredictability. In particular, we 
include additional indicators to better account for recipient countries’ need and merit (column 1), 
we account for potentially relevant donor characteristics (column 2), and we add variables 
capturing selfish donor motives (column 3). Finally, we enter all these additional variables at the 
same time in column 4 of Table 3. For the sake of brevity, we restrict ourselves to 
Fragmentation_3, our preferred measure of fragmented donor-recipient relations. 
The evidence on our core set of control variables is essentially as before in Table 2, with 
one exception. In particular, the signs and significance levels of the coefficients on Population 
and Polity2 are hardly affected when accounting for a longer list of potential determinants. The 
same applies to the lagged dependent variable, though the degree of estimated temporal 
dependence becomes even smaller. The one exception is that a higher per capita income now 
statistically significantly predicts also smaller downward deviations in aid, not just smaller 
upward deviations, in columns 1 and 4. One can interpret this finding as suggesting that relatively 
richer recipient countries manage to keep deviations in check by better capacity of bargaining aid 
delivery with donors and more efficient domestic aid administration. Conversely, this finding 
implies that mainly poor countries, which also tend to be more dependent on aid, are likely to 
suffer from less predictable aid. 
The evidence on our additional indicators of need and merit is mixed. There is evidence 
that a move toward a more democratic regime is rewarded with the disbursement of more aid 
than originally planned. However, we find no statistically significant effects of changes in growth 
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 However, the F-test for Fragmentation_1 does not reject the equality of coefficients for upward and downward 
deviations – in contrast to the F-tests for Fragmentation_2 and Fragmentation_3. 
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of GDP per capita and natural disaster severity on aid deviations. The latter is not implausible: 
Recall that we consider country programmable aid (CPA) as the basis for calculating gaps 
between planned and actual aid, while donors react to disasters mainly by increasing emergency 
relief. The significantly negative coefficients on Orphan for downward deviations suggest that 
donors reduced the bias against identified aid orphans (as reflected in negative deviations from 
planned aid), while the significantly positive coefficients on Darling suggest that positive 
deviations from planned aid were self-reinforcing for identified aid darlings. 
We find no evidence that aid becomes less predictable for recipient countries whose aid is 
largely from donors not releasing forward spending plans. Likewise, we find no (column 4) or 
only weak (column 2) evidence that a larger share of aid from egoistic donors results in higher 
overshooting of planned aid. As concerns specific aid motives, it appears that UNSC membership 
increases deviations from planned aid in both directions. The significantly positive coefficients 
for UNSC with respect to overshooting planned aid were to be expected from donors granting aid 
to buy votes from UNSC members. At the same time, the significantly positive coefficients for 
UNSC with respect to undershooting planned aid may indicate that donors tend to cut planned aid 
after observing non-compliant UNSC votes.  In contrast to the strong evidence on political aid 
motives, we do not find that export-related aid motives result in less predictable aid. The 
typically insignificant coefficients on Exp_ratio and Exp_ave are in line with the view that 
competition for relevant export markets should be rather persistent and reflected in forward 
spending plans already. More generally, recent studies have cast into doubt that trade-related 
donor interests are a major driving force of aid allocation.
28
  
Importantly, the inclusion of additional explanatory variables in Table 3 affects our major 
result only modestly. As with the basic specification in Table 2, the coefficients on our preferred 
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 Barthel et al. (2014) provide an overview of the relevant literature. 
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measure of fragmented donor-recipient relations, Fragmentation_3, continue to be significantly 
positive with respect to overshooting planned aid. Comparing the quantitative impact of a one 
standard deviation increase in Fragmentation_3, it is of similar size in columns 1 and 3, but 
slightly weaker in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 (16 percent) than in the corresponding column 3 of 
Table 2 (21 percent). Again, as before, we do not find statistically significant effects of 
Fragmentation_3 on negative deviations between actual and planned aid and the estimated 
coefficients are small. However, several F-tests for the coefficients on Fragmentation_3 prove to 
be weaker than in Table 2. Specifically, it is only in column 1 of Table 3 that the F-test points to 
significantly different coefficients on Fragmentation_3 for upward and downward deviations 
form planned aid. 
In Table 4, we report results from specifications that test the robustness of our inferences 
to plausible extensions and changes to our model specification. In column 1 we cluster standard 
errors on both countries and reports. In column 2, we include regional dummy variables, 
employing the World Bank’s regional classification. All our estimations so far are based on data 
pooled across one, two and three year deviations from spending plans. In columns 3 to 5, we 
estimate the determinants for one, two and three year deviations separately.  
 We find in column 1 that our results fully uphold to additionally accounting for the fact 
that observations that use information from the same report are not independent from each other. 
Column 2 shows that the inclusion of regional dummy variables has practically no effect on our 
results. Compared to the pooled estimations, we find differences if we restrict our analysis to one, 
two or three year deviations between actual aid and scheduled aid plans, respectively. In 
particular, we find that fragmented donor-recipient relations have a much stronger effect on 
longer term upward deviations than shorter term deviations. The effect on two year deviations is 
40 per cent larger than the effect from the pooled estimation. The effect on three year deviations 
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is three times larger than the effect from the pooled estimation. Naturally, this can only be 
consistent with our main estimations if the effect on one year deviations is small or even 
negative. This is indeed what we find: a negative effect that is however small in size and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. The pattern of small and insignificant effects on 
deviations in the short run and much stronger effects on longer term deviations is not surprising. 
It was to be expected that aid allocation resembles the more general phenomenon that deviations 
from planned state budgets tend to widen over time. Increasing cost overruns for projects in 
public infrastructure, compared to the originally planned baseline, provide a well-known 
example. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Aid flows continue to be volatile and unpredictable, even though it is widely accepted that this 
erodes the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting the economic and social development of 
recipient countries. The donors of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have 
principally accepted that predictability in aid relationships is important to enable sound economic 
management in the recipient countries. This invited the question of why there is little progress, if 
any, in rendering aid more predictable. 
We hypothesized that deviations between actual and planned aid flows can in part be 
attributed to fragmented donor-recipient relationships, notably the large number of minor aid 
relations that tend to be associated with donors’ ‘flying their flag’ around the world. We 
considered several measures of fragmentation. At the same time, we accounted for various other 
factors that may result in deviations of actual aid from previously released spending plans, 
including changing conditions in the recipient countries, donor characteristics, and strategic and 
trade-related aid motives. To allow for heterogeneous effects on positive and negative deviations 
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between actual and planned aid, we estimated separate effects on overshooting and undershooting 
of actual aid compared to scheduled aid. 
Accounting for temporal dynamics with the lagged dependent variable, we find inertia in 
upward and downward deviations over time. In other words, donors do not ‘correct’ an earlier 
over- or under-shooting of spending plans by subsequent moves in the opposite direction. A more 
democratic regime is predicted to experience more upward deviation of aid with democracy 
having no statistically significant effect on downward deviations. Moreover, a move toward a 
more democratic regime is rewarded with the disbursement of more aid than originally planned. 
There is some evidence that richer recipient countries have better chances to keep deviations in 
check, while mainly poor countries, which also tend to be more dependent on aid, are likely to 
suffer from less predictable aid.  The evidence on indicators capturing unexpected changes in 
need is surprisingly weak. Specifically, donors did not react to deviations in growth in GDP per 
capita from the recent past by adjusting aid spending plans.  
Our findings on donor characteristics and egoistic aid motives are inconclusive. While 
export-related interests do not appear to be responsible for unpredictable aid flows, UNSC 
membership of recipient countries is associated with higher (upward and downward) deviations 
of actual aid from previous spending plans. In future research, it will be possible to analyze the 
links between aid fragmentation and donor characteristics and motives more systematically. An 
increasing number of bilateral donors have agreed since 2012 to make their detailed spending 
plans public. Consequently, the DAC now provides access to donor-specific survey results on 
planned aid across recipient countries for 2013 and subsequent years 
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1). These data can be used to assess the 
differences in aid predictability between donors once actual aid flows become available for these 
years. 
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Regarding our explanatory variables of principal interest, all measures of fragmented 
donor-recipient relations prove to be statistically significantly positive and substantive in size 
when positive deviations between actual and planned aid represent the dependent variable. In 
contrast to positive deviations, all fragmentation measures are statistically insignificant and 
diminishingly small in size when negative deviations between actual and planned aid represent 
the dependent variable. 
The asymmetric effects of fragmented donor-recipient relations on overshooting and 
undershooting previously released aid plans may be surprising when considering “that over-
disbursement (donors disbursing more than scheduled) can be as challenging for a partner 
government as under-disbursement (a donor disbursing less than the amount scheduled) as it 
hinders effective planning, budgeting and execution” (OECD 2011a: 74). However, these longer-
term problems of unpredictable aid in general – independent of whether plans are over- or 
undershot – may be discounted by short-sighted actors on both sides of aid relations. Recipient 
countries may not press harder for less fragmented aid relations, e.g., by unilaterally 
discontinuing non-significant relations, as they are mainly concerned about unexpected cuts of 
aid inflows, while taking the opportunity of playing competing donors off against each other and 
extract extra funds over and above planned aid. Donor agencies trying to maximize their budget 
may be willing to adhere in order to win the competition among donors and convince key 
constituencies at home that the agency’s current funds are insufficient. 
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Table 1 – Baseline results, no differentiation between over- and under-shooting  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
lagged DV (ln) 0.218*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0510) (0.0499) 
Population (ln) 0.325*** 0.334*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0441) (0.0443) 
GDPpc (ln) -0.123** -0.133** -0.134** 
 (0.0613) (0.0651) (0.0628) 
Polity2 0.0321*** 0.0326*** 0.0333*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
Fragmentation_1 0.872*   
 (0.460)   
Fragmentation_2  0.873  
  (0.586)  
Fragmentation_3   0.852** 
   (0.429) 
Observations 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.344 0.343 0.345 
    
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on recipient country in parentheses. Estimations include year-, report- and deviation-
specific fixed effects (coefficients not shown).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 2 – Baseline results, differentiating between over- and under-shooting 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev 
lagged DV (ln) 0.234*** 0.209*** 0.238*** 0.210*** 0.232*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0734) (0.0647) (0.0739) (0.0638) (0.0731) 
 0.79  0.76 0.80 
Population (ln) 0.293*** 0.345*** 0.303*** 0.351*** 0.306*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0550) (0.0505) (0.0536) (0.0510) (0.0536) 
 0.35  0.37 0.45 
GDPpc (ln) -0.155** -0.0984 -0.181** -0.0956 -0.176** -0.102 
 (0.0731) (0.0753) (0.0773) (0.0797) (0.0749) (0.0748) 
 0.49  0.33 0.36 
Polity2 0.0421*** 0.0211 0.0425*** 0.0214 0.0436*** 0.0214 
 (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0135) 
 0.22 0.22 0.19 
Fragmentation_1 1.601*** 0.253     
 (0.596) (0.693)     
 0.14     
Fragmentation_2   1.742** 0.141   
   (0.715) (0.773)   
   0.09   
Fragmentation_3     1.596*** 0.197 
     (0.538) (0.606) 
     0.08 
Observations 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.351 0.351 0.354 
       
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on recipient country in parentheses followed by p-value of F-test for coefficient equality. Estimations include year-, report- and 
deviation-specific fixed effects (coefficients not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 – Extended specifications 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev 
lagged DV (ln) 0.156** 0.194** 0.229*** 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.179** 0.143** 0.167** 
 (0.0650) (0.0753) (0.0608) (0.0730) (0.0643) (0.0735) (0.0640) (0.0740) 
 0.68 0.76 0.61 0.79 
Population (ln) 0.265*** 0.348*** 0.295*** 0.325*** 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.302*** 0.327*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0658) (0.0519) (0.0543) (0.0880) (0.0841) (0.0972) (0.101) 
 0.16 0.56 0.96 0.73 
GDPpc (ln) -0.204** -0.199** -0.205** -0.106 -0.182** -0.123 -0.230* -0.221** 
 (0.0915) (0.0849) (0.0787) (0.0747) (0.0855) (0.0905) (0.116) (0.108) 
 0.95 0.23 0.48 0.93 
Polity2 0.0458*** 0.0224 0.0444*** 0.0179 0.0432*** 0.0211 0.0437*** 0.0195 
 (0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0165) 
 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.21 
Fragmentation_3 1.634*** 0.166 1.276** 0.465 1.588*** 0.338 1.291** 0.681 
 (0.560) (0.607) (0.586) (0.741) (0.553) (0.627) (0.639) (0.744) 
 0.06 0.36 0.14 0.51 
Change in polity2 0.122*** 0.0112     0.126*** 0.00930 
 (0.0357) (0.0421)     (0.0361) (0.0419) 
 0.06   0.04 
Deviation from growth path 0.00606 -0.000901     0.0105 -0.00595 
 (0.0186) (0.0155)     (0.0187) (0.0153) 
 0.76   0.46 
Disasters (ln) 0.0271 -0.000604     0.0192 0.00528 
 (0.0176) (0.0166)     (0.0193) (0.0173) 
 0.23   0.57 
Orphan -0.214 -0.545**     -0.205 -0.524** 
 (0.204) (0.220)     (0.224) (0.254) 
 0.18   0.29 
Darling 0.679*** -0.342     0.729*** -0.323 
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 (0.187) (0.334)     (0.197) (0.365) 
 0.00   0.01 
No_spplan   0.0910 0.956   0.809 0.467 
   (0.507) (0.640)   (0.621) (0.711) 
   0.28  0.71 
Egoistic   0.860* -0.878   0.314 -0.817 
   (0.445) (0.618)   (0.498) (0.635) 
   0.01  0.14 
UNSC     0.629*** 0.637** 0.519** 0.700** 
     (0.226) (0.249) (0.226) (0.302) 
    0.98 0.62 
Exp_ratio     -1.168 0.840 -1.653 0.452 
     (1.243) (1.259) (1.115) (1.398) 
    0.22 0.20 
Exp_ave     -0.0431 -0.0398* 0.0303 -0.0394 
     (0.0619) (0.0206) (0.0688) (0.0257) 
    0.95 0.28 
Observations 619 625 631 613 
R-squared 0.384 0.365 0.367 0.408 
 
Note: Column 1 includes further variables of recipient need and merit, column 2 variables of donor characteristics and column 3 variables of donor interest. Column 
4 includes all additional control variables together. Standard errors clustered on recipient country in parentheses followed by p-value of F-test for coefficient equality. 
Estimations include year-, report- and deviation-specific fixed effects (coefficients not shown).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 –Robustness tests 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev  Pos dev Neg dev 
           
lagged DV (ln) 0.232*** 0.209*** 0.229*** 0.186*** 0.218** 0.139 0.260*** 0.168* 0.229* 0.355*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0656) (0.0685) (0.0876) (0.116) (0.0725) (0.0916) (0.116) (0.112) 
 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.41 0.44 
Population (ln) 0.306*** 0.345*** 0.313*** 0.361*** 0.290*** 0.342*** 0.309*** 0.428*** 0.297*** 0.209** 
 (0.0318) (0.0763) (0.0521) (0.0546) (0.0615) (0.0691) (0.0637) (0.0674) (0.0785) (0.0923) 
 0.55 0.34 0.46 0.07 0.34 
GDPpc (ln) -0.176*** -0.102 -0.158* -0.0868 -0.133* -0.220** -0.143 -0.126 -0.387** 0.203* 
 (0.0503) (0.132) (0.0809) (0.0752) (0.0729) (0.0867) (0.104) (0.113) (0.177) (0.119) 
 0.63 0.39 0.37 0.91 0.00 
Polity2 0.0436** 0.0214 0.0537*** 0.0315** 0.0424*** 0.0182 0.0592*** 0.0381* 0.0260 -0.00911 
 (0.0171) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0222) (0.0167) (0.0273) 
 0.42 0.20 0.26 0.44 0.27 
Fragmentation_3 1.596*** 0.197 1.496*** -0.0102 -0.186 -0.0767 2.310*** 0.168 5.241*** 0.862 
 (0.400) (0.294) (0.536) (0.593) (0.648) (0.791) (0.741) (0.879) (1.502) (1.194) 
 0.00 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.03 
Observations 631 625 316 211 104 
R-squared 0.354 0.360 0.285 0.429 0.546 
 
Note: Column 1 clusters observations on both countries and reports. Column 2 includes regional dummy variables.  Columns 3 to 5 present separate (instead of 
pooled) estimations for one, two and three year deviations from spending plans. Standard errors clustered on recipient country in parentheses followed by p-value of 
F-test for coefficient equality. Estimations include year- and report--specific fixed effects; pooled estimations also include deviation-specific fixed effects 
(coefficients not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Appendix 1 – Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variable aid deviation, i.e., the difference between actual and planned 
(CPA); in absolute terms, constant 2011 US$, million, logged 
DAC reports 
Population (ln) Total population of a recipient country in year t; logged and 
lagged by one year 
World Bank, WDI 
GDPpc (ln) GDP per capita of a recipient country in year t; logged and 
lagged by one year 
World Bank, WDI 
Polity2 Revised combined polity score of  a recipient country in year t; 
democracy score minus autocracy score; range from 10 
(strongly  democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic); lagged by 
one year 
Polity IV dataset 
Fragmentation_1 First proxy of the relative importance of ‘non-significant’ aid 
relations for each recipient country in year t; aid relations are 
considered non-significant if a donor country provides a lower 
share of aid to a recipient country than the donor’s overall share 
in aid to all recipient countries; the number of non-significant 
aid relations is then  related to the number of all aid relations of 
a recipient country in year t; see text for details 
Creditor Reporting 
System; own calculations 
Fragmentation_2 Second proxy of the relative importance of ‘non-significant’ aid 
relations for each recipient country in year t; aid relations are 
considered non-significant if a donor country is not among the 
largest donors that cumulatively provide at least 90 percent of 
aid from all 23 DAC donors to a recipient country in year t; see 
text for details 
Creditor Reporting 
System; own calculations 
Fragmentation_3 Combination of Fragmentation_1 and Fragmentation_2; see text 
for details 
Creditor Reporting 
System; own calculations 
Deviation from 
growth path 
Difference in the growth rate in GDP per capita (constant local 
currency) in year t from the average growth rate in the three 
previous years t-3, t-2, and t-1; lagged by one year 
World Bank, WDI 
Disasters (ln) Number of people affected by natural disasters; logged and 
lagged by one year 
International Disaster 
Database 
(http://www.emdat.be/) 
Orphan Dummy variable set to one for recipient countries and years 
when actual aid (CPA in constant US$) was lower than the 
‘normal pattern’ by at least one percent of the recipient 
country’s GDP in year t; the ‘normal pattern’ is estimated by 
regressing CPA in constant 2011 US$ on the recipient 
countries’ GDP per capita, population and its score on ‘voice 
and accountability’ from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (pooled across all recipient countries and 
the years 2007-2011); see text for details 
DAC reports; World 
Bank; own calculations 
Darling Dummy variable set to one for recipient countries and years 
when actual aid (CPA in constant US$) was higher than the 
‘normal pattern’ by at least one percent of the recipient 
country’s GDP in year t; the ‘normal pattern’ is estimated by 
regressing CPA in constant 2011 US$ on the recipient 
countries’ GDP per capita, population and its score on ‘voice 
and accountability’ from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators(pooled across all recipient countries and 
the years 2007-2011) ; see text for details 
DAC reports; World 
Bank; own calculations 
No_spplan Share of donor countries not releasing forward aid spending 
plans in total aid commitments by all donors to a recipient 
DAC reports; Creditor 
Reporting System; own 
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country in year t; donors belonging to this group vary over time, 
with Japan and the United States being included throughout the 
period of observation 
calculations 
Egoistic Share of donors classified as egoistic by Berthélemy in total aid 
commitments by all donors to a recipient country in year t; 
including Australia, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States 
Berthélemy (2006); 
Creditor Reporting 
System, own calculations 
UNSC Dummy variable set to one for recipient countries and years 
with membership in the UN Security Council; lagged by one 
year 
United Nations 
Exp_ratio Proxy of export competition among donors granting aid to a 
recipient country in year t; for all dyads of active donors, we 
calculate the ratio of export shares by dividing the lower export 
share by the higher export share in the dyad of donors active in 
a recipient country in year t; we then take the average of all 
dyadic ratios, with higher average ratios indicating stronger 
competition among donors (see text for details); lagged by one 
year 
COMTRADE; own 
calculations 
Exp_ave Proxy of the average importance of a recipient country in year t 
as an export market for donors granting aid; calculated as the 
average export share of all active donors in a recipient country 
in year t (see text for details) ; lagged by one year 
COMTRADE; own 
calculations 
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Appendix 2 – Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dep. Variable (pooled) 631 4.03 1.41 -2.66 7.55 
One year deviation 316 3.84 1.41 -2.66 7.07 
Two year deviation 211 4.11 1.40 -1.09 7.01 
Three year deviation 104 4.45 1.35 -0.18 7.55 
Population (ln) 631 16.21 1.61 13.09 20.99 
GDPpc (ln) 631 7.31 1.11 4.98 9.63 
Polity2 631 2.80 5.89 -9.00 10.00 
Fragmentation_1 631 0.73 0.11 0.27 0.95 
Fragmentation_2 631 0.69 0.10 0.27 0.91 
Fragmentation_3 631 0.64 0.13 0.09 0.91 
Change in polity2 628 0.05 1.42 -9.00 11.00 
Deviation from growth path 631 -1.35 5.01 -25.63 13.58 
Disasters (ln) 631 8.16 5.56 0.00 19.08 
Orphan 622 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Darling 622 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
No_spplan 625 0.25 0.17 -0.03 0.85 
Egoistic 625 0.35 0.20 -0.03 0.91 
UNSC 631 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Exp_ratio 631 0.39 0.10 0.13 0.65 
Exp_ave 631 0.91 2.50 0.00 23.81 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Donors not releasing forward spending plans 
DAC Reports on Aid Predictability from: 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Japan 
Korea 
United States 
 
Greece 
Japan 
United States 
Greece 
Japan 
United States 
Greece 
Japan 
United States 
Greece 
Japan 
Norway 
United States 
 
 
 
